Moral Right Revisited: Are We Closer to Full Protection for Authors by Yuen, Edward D. L.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 1 | Number 2 Article 6
1-1-1978
Moral Right Revisited: Are We Closer to Full
Protection for Authors
Edward D. L. Yuen
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward D. L. Yuen, Moral Right Revisited: Are We Closer to Full Protection for Authors, 1 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 419 (1978).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol1/iss2/6
Moral Right Revisited: Are We
Closer to Full Protection
for Authors?
By EDWARD D.L. YUEN
Member, third year class
Introduction
The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to secure the
rights of authors' in order to promote the "Progress of Science and
useful Arts."I The copyright laws which have resulted from the exer-
cise of this power have, in major respects, compromised the rights
of authors to competing interests.'
The Copyright Revision Act of 19761 has brought significant
changes to our copyright laws, changes which more fully recognize
the rights of authors.' The New Act has also been heralded as bring-
ing United States copyright law into alignment with the copyright
laws of other nations, thus making United States adherence to the
Berne Convention' a realistic possibility.'
1. For convenience the term "author" is used throughout to refer to the creators of all art
forms and is not restricted to literature. The term "publisher" is similarly used to refer to all
commercial users of literary and artistic property.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Perhaps the clearest example of such a compromise is the existence of the manufacturing
clause in our copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). The manufacturing clause has been a
part of American copyright law since 1891. Generally, it requires books and periodicals in the
English language to be manufactured in the United States in order to receive full copyright
protection. The resultant benefit to American printers at the expense of authors, especially
foreign authors, is obvious. For discussions which have called for the repeal of the manufac-
turing clause see McCannon, Study No. 35, The Manufacturing Clause of the U.S. Copyright
Law, 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHr 1123 (Arthur Fisher Mem. ed. 1963); Ashford, The Compulsory
Manufacturing Provision: Copyright Protection to the Foreign Author, ASCAP, 4 COPYMIGHr
L. SymP. 48 (1952).
4. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq. (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as New Act].
5. An example of this change in attitude is the elimination of the manufacturing clause
after July 1, 1982. 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1976). Other notable changes favoring authors include
extension of the term of copyright from a potential term of 56 years under 17 U.S.C. § 24
(1970) to a term of the life of the author plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). Although
the notice requirement is retained in the New Act, provisions now prevent total divestiture
of copyright protection in the event a work is published without notice. 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1976).
6. The Berne Convention is a multilateral treaty, presently between over 60 countries,
which prescribes certain minimum standards for the protection of literary and artistic prop-
erty for its members. It is the oldest international copyright union having been formalized in
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This change of attitude, as evidenced by the New Act, is long
overdue since American copyright law has long been considered an
anomaly in the world of copyright legislation. For various reasons,
some of which will be explored in this note, our copyright laws have
resisted the trend of expanded copyright protection afforded authors
in most countries. For example, the United States has continued the
requirements of notice' and registration' as prerequisites to copy-
right protection in spite of the abandonment of all formalities by the
Berne Convention.o Our "manufacturing clause" is similarly
unique in copyright legislation."
Despite the advances made by the New Act, the law of intellec-
tual property in the United States continues to lag behind its Euro-
pean counterparts in at least one major respect. The "moral right"
doctrine, which forms so prominent a part of copyright laws in civil
law countries, 2 has still not been adopted in this country. Moreover,
1886. Although the United States was represented at the official organizational meetings in
1885 it did not sign the 1886 treaty. S. LADAS, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 82 (1938) [hereinafter cited as LADAS].
Berne remains a major force in international copyright and retains its vitality through
international revision conferences held approximately every 20 years. For a thorough discus-
sion of the Berne Convention and its probable impact on American authors and publishers
see Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the
United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1967).
7. Abelman and Berkowitz, International Copyright Law, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 619 (1977).
Among other benefits, adherence to Berne would provide a greater measure of protection to
authors and increase the number of nations with which the United States has international
copyright relations, thereby broadening the protection of authors throughout the world. For
a full discussion of the benefits which would be derived from accession to Berne see Nimmer,
supra note 6, at 549-54.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
9. Id. at § 408.
10. The Berne Convention articles were revised in Berlin in 1908 so that Berlin Convention,
art. 4 provides that: "The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to
the performance of any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise are independent of the
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work . . ." UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAws
& TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1977) [hereinafter cited as CLTW]. Copyright in almost all other
countries is automatic with publication. For a discussion of the differences between American
copyright law (prior to the New Act) and the Berne articles (which reflect the copyright
legislation of most countries) see Derenberg, The Status of United States Authors and Works
First Published in the United States Under the Universal Copyright Convention, 5 COPYRIGHT
BULL. 206 (1958).
11. See supra note 3.
12. Some of the countries which explicitly provide for moral right protection in their copy-
right statutes include: Austria (Federal Act on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art
and Related Rights (Copyright Act), Part II, ch. 1, § 68 (1936). Official German text:
Bundesgesetzblatt, p. 131 (1936)); France (Law No. 57-296 on Literary and Artistic Property,
Title I, art. 1, 6 (1957). Official French text: [1957] J.O. at 2723); West Germany (An Act
dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, § IV, art. 12-14 (1965). Official German text:
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circumstances are such that adoption of such legislation is unlikely
in the forseeable future."
Forty years ago, one commentator observed that "despite the
importance of the doctrine of moral right, it is amazing how little
study has been accorded to it in American literature."" Since that
observation only two significant articles have been written on the
subject.'" This note undertakes to present the concept of moral
right, to identify the theoretical reasons for its rejection in this
country, and to suggest how the doctrine might be incorporated into
our case law without violating any principles of American jurisprud-
ence.
The Doctrine of Moral Right
The doctrine of moral right is indigenous to continental Europe
and was expressed by the French courts as early as 1850.16 Copyright
BGB1, No. 5 at 1273 (1965)); East Germany (Copyright Act, Sec. 4, subsec. 14-17 (1965).
Official German text: GB1.DDR, Part 1, No. 14 at 209 (1965)); Italy (Law No. 633 of April
22, 1941, for the Protection of Copyright and Other Rights Connected with the Exercise
Thereof, ch. III, § II, art. 20-24. Official Italian text: Gaz. Uff. No. 166 (1941)); Japan (Law
No. 48 of 1970, ch. II, § 3, art. 17-20); Mexico (Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright
of December 29, 1956, ch. I, art. 2(I), (II). Official Spanish text: D.O. 1963)); Portugal
(Copyright Code, Decree-Law No. 46980, §§ VI, VII, art. 55-58. Official Portuguese text:
Diario do Governo, No. 99 (1966)); Sweden (Law No. 729 of 1960 on Copyright in Literary
and Artistic Works, ch. 1, § 3. Official Swedish text: Svensk Forfattningssomling at 1949
(1960)). English translations of the aforementioned codes appear in CLTW.
13. See infra note 32.
14. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Roeder].
15. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law: A Proposal, ASCAP,
4 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 79 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Katz]; Strauss, Study No. 4, The Moral
Right of the Author, 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 963 (Arthur Fisher Mem. ed. 1963) [hereinafter
cited as Strauss]. Both above cited articles have been widely relied on by the courts and
lawyers. Katz, however, argues that the copyright laws should be amended to include the
moral right. This, the present writer thinks, is untenable. See text accompanying notes 33-
48, infra. Strauss, on the other hand, argues that the same rights protected by the moral right
doctrine are adequately protected by our courts through more traditional causes of action
such as invasion of privacy, unfair competition and basic contract law. For a discussion of
the inadequacy of this approach see text accompanying notes 53-61, infra.
Other American studies of the moral right include: Stevenson, Moral Right and the Com-
mon Law: A Proposal, ASCAP, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 89 (1955); Note, Moral Right in the
United States, 35 CONN. B.J. 509 (1961); Comment, The Moral Rights of the Author: A
Comparative Study, 71 DICK. L. REV. 93 (1966); Treece, American Law Analogues of the
Author's "Moral Right", 16 AM. J. ComP. L. 487 (1968).
For a discussion of the moral right in French law by a French scholar see Saurraute, Current
Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L.
465 (1968).
16. Clesinger et Laneuville C. Gauvain, Trib. cour de Lyon [1850] D.P. (as cited in
Roeder, at 555).
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seeks to encourage literary and artistic pursuits by granting to au-
thors the exclusive right to exploit their work" for a statutory pe-
riod." Unlike the copyright, which is an economic right based on
property concepts," the moral right is a personal right similar to
those rights in tort which protect the individual from injury. The
doctrine of moral right recognizes that upon the sale of their work
authors part with more than an item of property. Through publica-
tion authors expose themselves to the public. The oft quoted concur-
ring opinion of Judge Seabury in Clemens v. Press Publishing Co.20
well illustrates the concept.
Even the matter of fact attitude of the law does not require us to
consider the sale of the rights to a literary production in the same
way that we would consider the sale of a barrel of pork . . . The
man who sells a barrel of pork to another may pocket the purchase
price and retain no further interest in what becomes of the pork.
While an author may write to earn his living and may sell his
literary productions, yet the purchaser, in the absence of a contract
which permits him so to do, cannot make as free a use of it as he
could of the pork which he purchased . . . If the intent of the
parties was that the defendant should purchase the rights to the
literary property and publish it, the author is entitled not only to
be paid for his work but to have it published in the manner in
which he wrote it.2'
Under copyright authors have the exclusive right to sell their work;
the right to have that work published in the manner in which they
wrote it is protected by the moral right in those countries which
recognize it.
While the right to prevent distortion of the work remains primary
under moral right the doctrine has been expanded further. Like the
copyright the moral right is now a bundle of rights.22 Ladas, study-
ing the laws of various European countries, has categorized the
moral right into three basic groups.
(1) The right of authors to control the publication and presenta-
tion of their work. Included in this first group is the right of authors
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
18. Id. at § 302.
19. In keeping with the notion of copyright as a property right it may be sold, bequeathed
by will or, should the owner die intestate, pass as personal property under applicable state
laws. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1976).
20. 122 N.Y.S. 206, 67 Misc. 183 (1910).
21. Id. at 207, 67 Misc. at 184.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) lists the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.
23. LADAS, at 576.
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to create and publish in any form desired, refuse to create even after
contracting to, modify the work at will and withdraw the work from
publication when it no longer reflects their philosophy or conviction.
(2) The right of authors to have their authorship recognized. This,
the so-called "paternity right," insures that the author's name will
be affixed to his work. It also precludes the use of his name on any
work not of his creation and the use of his real name when a nom
de plume has been used.
(3) The right of authors to prevent any modification or mutilation
of their work. This remains the cornerstone of the moral right doc-
trine. It allows writers to prevent users of their work from altering,
and thereby distorting it. Painters are likewise protected in that it
affords them the right to prevent mutilation of their work.
In addition to these three categories other aspects of the moral
right include the right of authors to prevent excessive criticism of
their work and a prohibition against other acts which may serve to
injure the author's reputation or honor.24 Further, the moral right,
being a personal right, is nonassignable. Oftentimes it is also held
to be perpetual.2 5
The latter two categories of the moral right doctrine presented
above were incorporated into the Berne Convention Articles in 1928
at the Rome Convention. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention now
reads:
(1) Independently of the patrimonial rights of the author, and even
after the assignment of the said rights, the author retains the right
to claim the authorship of the work as well as the right to object
to every deformation, mutilation or other modification of the said
work, which may be prejudicial to his honor or his reputation."
The presence of the moral right clause in the Berne Articles has
been, and continues to be, a major stumbling block to United States
adherence to the Berne Union. Prior to our joining the Universal
Copyright Convention" in 1954, several bills were introduced in
24. Id. This aspect of the moral right is intended to protect the author from all arts which
may damage his professional standing. For example, an author would have a cause of action
where his statements are quoted to endorse a commercial product. Strauss, at 123.
25. See infra note 89.
26. CLTW, Rome Convention, art. 6bis (1) (1928).
27. The Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) is a multilateral treaty, presently be-
tween 70 countries, which provides certain minimum standards for the protection of literary
and artistic property for its members. Overall, the U.C.C. provides a lesser measure of protec-
tion for authors than does the Berne Convention. Principally at the insistence of the United
States the U.C.C. articles require compliance with notice and registration provisions as a
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Congress to amend the copyright laws of this country to make adhe-
sion to Berne possible. These bills were motivated by the obvious
need for the United States to belong to an international copyright
organization." Both the "Duffy Bill"29 and the "Shotwell Bill""o
contained provisions which would protect the moral right of au-
thors; both failed.' The failure of these bills marked the end of any
serious legislative attempt to extend this protection to authors.
With the United States now firmly a part of the Universal Copy-
right Convention, the pressure to amend the copyright laws to in-
clude the moral right in accordance with Berne requirements no
longer exists.12 As the next section illustrates, amending the copy-
prerequisite to copyright protection. Also, no moral right protection is afforded under the
U.C.C. See Abelman and Berkowitz, supra note 7, at 637-43.
The U.C.C. was sponsored by the United Nations and became effective on Sept. 16, 1955.
It was intended to coexist with the Berne Convention and contains provisions which would
preclude a Berne member from renouncing Berne and subsequently relying on the U.C.C. in
copyright relations with other Berne members. 6 U.S.T. art. XVII.
28. Prior to joining the U.C.C., the United States belonged only to the Buenos Aires
Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyright. In addition, the United States had bilateral
arrangements with 38 countries with protection varying from country to country. RINGER AND
GrruN, COPYRIGHTS 86-87 (rev. ed. 1965). Putting it mildly, international copyright protection
for domestic authors was at best confusing. Moreover, prior to their accession to the U.C.C.,
the United States and the Soviet Union were the only major countries which did not belong
to an international copyright union.
29. S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1935) provided:
Independently of the copyright in any work secured under this act, as amended,
and even after assignment thereof, the author retains the right to claim the author-
ship of the work as well as the right to object to every deformation, mutilation, or
other modification of the said work which may be prejudicial to his honor or to his
reputation: Provided, however. That nothing in this paragraph shall limit or other-
wise affect the right of full freedom of contract between the author of a work and
an assignee or licensee thereof, or invalidate any express waiver or release by the
author of any such rights or of any remedies or relief to which he might be entitled
in consequence of a violation thereof, and the assignee or licensee of the author's
moral right may, with the author's permission, make any change in the work which
the author himself would have had a right to make prior to such assignment.
In the absence of a special contract or notice by the author at the time he
consented to the use of his work the necessary editing, arranging or adaptation of
such work for publication in book form or for use in a newspaper, magazine, or
periodical, in broadcasting, in motion pictures or in mechanical or electrical reprod-
uction in accordance with customary standards and reasonable requirements, shall
not be defined to contravene the right of authors reserved in this section: provided
that nothing in this section shall be deemed to alter or in any manner impair any
right or remedy of an author at common law or in equity.
30. S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 5 (1940).
31. The "Duffy Bill" as amended passed the Senate on August 7, 1935. In the House the
bill was never acted on as Congress adjourned while it was still in committee. LADAS, at 860.
The "Shotwell Bill" failed in Congress and was never given a hearing of which any known
record was preserved. Katz, at 144.
32. Any chance for the inclusion of a moral right provision in our copyright law probably
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right laws to include the moral right may have raised problems un-
imagined by the proponents of change.
The Incompatibility of Moral Right With American
Copyright Theory
The reasons most often advanced for the rejection of the moral
right doctrine in this country have been: the opposition of motion
picture producers and other users of creative works,"3 judicial and
legislative ignorance of the doctrine" and the ability of present con-
tract and tort law to provide similar protection." While these rea-
sons are partially valid, they fail to recognize the basic incompati-
bility of this doctrine with American copyright law as it has been
developed. Despite the view of some commentators, the doctrine of
moral right is repugnant to American copyright law." This, how-
ever, does not mean it is repugnant to American law in general.
The copyright clause" of the Constitution provides that Congress
shall have power to "promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
died with the United States adherence to the U.C.C. The United States has never demon-
strated any sympathy for the moral right doctrine and that it was ever considered at all was
due only to the great need for the United States to belong to an international copyright union.
One commentator summarized the attitude of American legislators toward copyright revi-
sion: "In 1933 toward the close of the first session of the 73rd Congress, companion bills [the
Duffy, Sirovich and Daly Bills] were introduced aimed at doing the minimum necessary to
permit adherence to the Rome Convention." McCannon, supra note 3, at 1141.
Despite our accession to the U.C.C. there are still significant benefits for authors to be
gained from accession to the Berne Convention. See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 549-54.
33. Roeder, at 558. See Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Foreign Relations
on Executive E, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (statements of Edwin P. Kilroe and Sydney M.
Kaye). Mr. Kilroe, the copyright adviser to Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, op-
posed the moral right doctrine by arguing that a "limitation on the right to change the plot,
theme, sequence and description of the characters in literary works would bring havoc to the
film industry." Id. at 20. Mr. Kaye, an attorney appearing on behalf of the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters, also opposed the doctrine fearing that the changes to works required by
the broadcast medium would "make every broadcast program a potential source of lawsuits."
Id. at 29. Professor Nimmer has observed that these objections were based "on a supposed,
rather than actual, conflict." Since Article 6bis of the Berne Convention does not preclude
alienability of moral rights users of works could simply acquire an author's moral rights by
contract. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 549. Moreover, the Duffy Bill provided for the free
alienation of moral rights. See supra note 29.
34. Katz, at 131-44.
35. Strauss, at 141-42.
36. Katz has written that: "The doctrine of moral right has fared badly in America not
because it is basically repugnant to American law, but rather because it has not received the
serious intellectual examination by either bench, bar, legislature or law school, to which it
has been entitled." Katz, at 145.
37. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." As
Ladas has pointed out, "copyright legislation passed in pursuance
of this grant of power to Congress is to be construed in light of the
constitutional provisions."" To establish the incompatibility of the
doctrine of moral right with American copyright it is essential to
understand the theory of copyright which has been developed by our
courts while construing the copyright clause. The United States
Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters," decided in 1834, ad-
vanced a theory of copyright which has survived intact to this day.
Between 1816 and 1827 Henry Wheaton authored twelve volumes
of reports of cases before the United States Supreme Court. Prior
to publication of the first volume, Wheaton transferred his rights in
it to Matthew Carey. Carey allegedly deposited the title page of the
volume with the clerk of the District Court of Pennsylvania to com-
ply with the requirements of the Copyright Act of 1790. Carey subse-
quently transferred his copyright to the firm of Matthew Carey &
Sons, which then transferred it to one Donaldson.
After publication of Wheaton's reports, Richard Peters compiled
and published a volume entitled Condensed Reports of Cases in the
Supreme Court of the United States, in which the first volume of
Wheaton's work was reproduced. Wheaton, along with Donaldson,
brought suit seeking injunctive relief.
Peters answered by denying that the publication was an infringe-
ment of copyright and further argued that plaintiffs, having failed
to comply with the requirements of the Copyright Act of 1790, had
no copyright at all. The Circuit Court in Pennsylvania agreed, hold-
ing that plaintiffs' failure to prove delivery of copies of the work to
the Office of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section Four of the
1790 Act was fatal to their copyright. 0
On appeal to the Supreme Court the appellants stated the issue
for the Court:
[lit is inquired whether the power granted to Congress by the
constitution transfers the whole subject of property of authors to
the exclusive authority and control of congress; so that the prop-
erty of an author ceases to exist at all,.without the legislation of
congress: or whether it leaves the author in the enjoyment of his
property, as he had it before the adoption of the constitution; and
38. LADAS, at 685.
39. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
40. Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 17486).
Coum/Ewr [Vol. 1426
MORAL RIGHT REVISITED
merely attempts to improve what was supposed to be an imperfect
enjoyment by authorizing congress to secure it."
The issue having been stated, appellants then contended that
England had long recognized that "an author had, at common law,
the sole and exclusive property in his copy . . . upon the foundation
of natural right."42 Since Pennsylvania had never enacted a copy-
right statute, the English common law copyright ipso facto applied
in Pennsylvania. Any noncompliance with the Copyright Act of
1790, therefore, served only to divest the author of rights granted by
the Act; the remedies provided by the common law, including in-
junctive relief, were retained.
More succinctly, the issue before the Court was whether an au-
thor, after publication of his work, retained rights to that work
based solely on his authorship; or are they wholly derived from the
copyright statutes?
In their endeavour to establish a theory of copyright before the
Court, appellants recognized the importance of distinguishing the
author from the inventor, an inventor's patent having long been
recognized as nothing more than a limited monopoly, wholly depen-
dent upon statutory provisions for its existence. 3 The appellants
argued that:
The common law property of an author is not taken away by the
constitution of the United States . . . In the constitutional clause
relating to the rights of authors and inventors, there are two sub-
jects, distinct enough in themselves, and only united by the form
of expression . . . They are so widely different, that the one is
property, the other a legalized monopoly. The one may be held and
enjoyed without injury to others; the other cannot, without great
prejudice. The one is a natural right, the other in some measure
against natural right."
If the copyright is with patents "in all respects alike, and equally
dependent on legislative favour for existence and protection," the
economic benefit of a limited monopoly granted to the author to
encourage literary pursuits would be the sole purpose of copyright.
The public interest would be primary, the author's rights simply one
of economic exploitation for a statutory period, and any further
protection of the author would have to come from outside the copy-
41. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 599.
42. Id. at 596.
43. Id. at 598.
44. Id. at 597-98.
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right laws. The issue was significant and the exhaustive arguments
of both the parties and the Court indicate their appreciation of the
importance of the controversy.
Mr. Justice McLean rendered the opinion for the Court. The ma-
jority saw no distinction between copyrights and patents, accord-
ingly Justice McLean asked:
In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an
individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine?
In the production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged,
as long, and, perhaps as usefully to the public, as any distin-
guished author in the composition of his book.
The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society,
and in their respective spheres they may be alike distinguished for
mental vigour. Does the common law give a perpetual right to the
author, and withhold it from the inventor? And yet it has never
been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any
property in his invention, after he shall have sold it publically . . .
That everyone is entitled to the fruits of his labour must be
admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statutory provi-
sion . . ."
For the Wheaton Court, "Congress instead of sanctioning an exist-
ing right . . . created it."" It then concluded that the rights of
authors, being conferred by statute, could only be acquired by strict
compliance with the statutory provisions.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not recognize the intimate
association of the author with his work, an association which simply
does not exist between the inventor and his invention." In fairness
to the Court, however, their seeming disregard for the unique rela-
tionship which exists between the author and his work is not wholly
indefensible. It may be that the Court took greater cognizance of the
public interest, subordinating the rights of the author to it. Insofar
as benefits to the public are concerned it may very well be difficult
to distinguish the contributions of the author from those of the
inventor. Moreover, the Court was engaged in interpreting the Con-
45. Id. at 657.
46. Id. at 661.
47. The differences between authors and inventors are in fact numerous and significant.
The intimate association of the author with his work simply does not exist between the
inventor and his invention. Inventions, with rare exception, are publicly exploited with no
identification of the inventor. Similarly, the uniqueness of a literary or artistic work does not
exist with inventions. The inventions of the world would in all probability exist today whether
or not their particular inventors ever existed.
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stitution. By granting protection to the author and the inventor in
the same constitutional clause, didn't the Framers intend them to
be in all respects treated alike? Wheaton established that they did
not combine the rights of authors and inventors in the same clause
merely "for brevity and comprehensiveness"" but intended to con-
fer the same rights. If the Wheaton case was correctly decided there
is no place for the moral right doctrine in our copyright laws. Re-
gardless, the decision has the inconsiderable advantage of tradition,
it has stood for nearly a century and a half.
Before leaving Wheaton, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Thompson deserves consideration. It has interest for our purposes
because it presents a view of copyright generally compatible with
the moral right doctrine.
While conceding the clouded origins of the common law rights of
authors, Justice Thompson argued that they should nevertheless be
recognized. Relying on Blackstone he wrote:
[Tihe true mode of ascertaining a moral right, is to inquire
whether it is such as the reason, the cultivated reason of mankind
must necessarily assent to. No proposition seems more conforma-
ble to that criterion, than that everyone should enjoy the reward
of his labour . . . Whether literary property is sui generis, or
under, whatever denomination of rights may be classed, it seems
founded upon the same principle of general utility to society. Thus
considered, an author's copyright ought to be esteemed an invalua-
ble right, established in sound reason and abstract morality .4
Justice Thompson then argued that an affirmative statute does
not abrogate a common law right. Thus, where the legislature has
acted there will be two concurrent remedies. 0 For Justice Thomp-
son, the author's interest prior to publication is protected by the
common law. Following publication these rights are secured by the
Copyright Act. Since this security is limited in duration, upon ter-
mination the author's interest is again protected by the common
law. "The protection for a limited time by the aid of penalties . . .
proceeds upon the ground that the author, within that time, can so
multiply his work, and reap such profits therefrom, as to enable him
to rest upon his common law right, without the extraordinary aid
of penal laws."" Justice Thompson thus would afford authors a
perpetual right.
48. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 664.
49. Id. at 671 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 690.
51. Id.
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Whereas the majority precluded the development of a separate
body of common law copyright protection, Justice Thompson recog-
nized the existence of such a body of law established in "abstract
morality," perceiving the Copyright Act as supplemental to it. Not
only would the extent of copyright have been perpetual by his rea-
soning, its breadth would also have been expanded. The courts,
rather than feeling the constraints of the monopoly concept in deter-
mining the rights of authors, would have been free to develop a
common law copyright limited only by "sound reason and abstract
morality."
It is important to bear in mind that the Wheaton decision nar-
rowed the scope of copyright to the protection of the author's eco-
nomic rights. It is not suggested that had the common law been
recognized in the decision, a moral right would have been incorpo-
rated into our copyright laws. The evidence is quite to the contrary,
moral right having never been recognized in either England or the
United States. What Wheaton did, however, is establish a concept
of copyright which is incompatible with the moral right doctrine.
Copyright because of Wheaton begins and ends as a legalized lim-
ited monopoly. 52
The Need For an American Moral Right Doctrine
As a result of the Wheaton decision it is now commonplace to
speak of copyright as embodying only the economic rights of authors
provided by federal statutes. This, however, does not mean that the
personal rights of authors are wholly unprotected. To the extent
that these rights have been upheld, American courts have found
protection "under more conventional and respectable labels such as
unfair competition, defamation, invasion of privacy and breach of
52. The theory of copyright developed by the Wheaton decision has remained intact.
Nearly a hundred years later a Patent Office official reported to Congress that:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Consti-
tution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, for
the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory rights,
but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of
science and useful arts will be promoted . . . The Constitution does not establish
copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if
it thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the
benefit of the public, such rights are given.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1926).
The courts have similarly reaffirmed the position taken by the Wheaton Court. See Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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contract."" Several commentators have argued that there is really
no need for adopting the moral right doctrine since present contract
and tort remedies offer the same protection to authors." There is
obvious merit to this argument, for many courts have in fact upheld
the personal rights of authors under traditional tort and contract
theories."
There are, however, shortcomings to the present approach used
by our courts. The "application of so many different doctrines to a
subject matter which is intrinsically homogeneous produces confu-
sion; choice of theory becomes dependent on a fortuitous combina-
tion of factors, rather than on the basic needs of the problem."" The
wide variety of theories relied on by the courts have forced authors
to resort to a "shotgun" approach in seeking to protect their rights.
For example, in Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.," the
author of the book Anna and the King of Siam alleged that a 1972
television series presented her work as a lighthearted comedy
"punctuated with bursts of dubbed laughter" when her book is a
serious literary work dealing with the struggle for human rights.
Claiming damage to her reputation and the literary property she
brought suit alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, misappro-
priation of literary property and wrongful attribution of credit." In
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.," plaintiffs also alleged muti-
lation of their work, a television comedy series entitled Monty Py-
thon's Flying Circus. They brought suit under the theories of breach
of contract, copyright infringement, violation of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act (Federal Unfair Competition Act) and violation of the
New York unfair competition statutes. 0
Having no recourse to the moral right, authors have also had to
rely on contractual provisions to protect their rights. The results
53. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 444 (1963).
54. Strauss, at 41-42.
55. See NIMMER, supra note 53, at 444-53.
56. Roeder, at 575.
57. 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
58. On this issue the court held that the plaintiff having granted defendant the right to
alter the work had no basis to complain. Further, the defendant, having truthfully acknowl-
edged that the series was "based on" plaintiffs work, did not engage in tortious conduct. Id.
at 500. For relevant portions of the contract granting Twentieth Century-Fox the right to alter
the work see infra note 67.
59. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
60. In that 27 percent of the original program was omitted (24 minutes from each 90 minute
program was cut to accomodate commercials) in contravention of contractual provisions to
show the programs in their entirety, the court found sufficient likelihood of success on the
merits to grant plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Id. at 19.
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have been far from satisfactory. Although dictum, one court had
occassion to write:
Title to the manuscript having passed by the completed contract
. . . the defendant was not obligated to publish it at all, nor could
plaintiff compel or prevent its publication, with or without his
name. The objections, refusals, and wishes of the plaintiff after
parting with the title in the property may betray the eccentricities
of the author; but they have no greater weight in law than the
wishes of a stranger to the transaction after it was consummated."
More recently, in Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp.," a prod-
ucer sought to enjoin the showing of an edited version of his film
Anatomy of a Murder on television. In denying relief the court held
that absent any specific contractual provision reserving to plaintiff
the right to approve the editing of his film, the custom of allowing
editing for commercials and time requirements would be determina-
tive. While agreeing with the outcome of the case (no extensive
cutting which would amount to mutilation was alleged) it does dem-
onstrate the burden placed on the author to actively protect his
work by contract. Interestingly, the court noted that Preminger had
inserted contract clauses which called for his approval of any editing
of two prior films he had sold to television. The court took this as
evidence of an intent on Preminger's part to release this film with-
out any control over editing." Since Anatomy of a Murder was a
superior film to The Moon is Blue and Man with the Golden Arm,
his two earlier films sold, it seems more likely that the omission of
an approval clause was an oversight on Preminger's part."
A further problem exists with contractual protection of an au-
thor's rights. As Katz has pointed out, the ability of an author to
maintain and protect his rights is realistic only if equality of bar-
gaining power is presumed." The absence of bargaining power may
be extremely difficult for the plaintiff-author to prove. In Landon"
the plaintiff had, thirty years earlier, sold the right to renew the
copyright to her work. Her claim that she was forced to give up her
renewal rights as a condition to the defendant purchasing her work
was dismissed. The court held that plaintiff needed to show that she
61. Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207, 67 Misc. 183, 184 (1910).
62. 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 49 Misc. 2d 362 (1966).
63. Id. at 602, 49 Misc. 2d at 369.
64. The contention that Anatomy of a Murder was one of the very few motion pictures with
a AA-1 rating was not challenged by the defendant. Id. at 596, 49 Misc. 2d at 364.
65. Katz, at 145.
66. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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wished to sell only the original copyright at the time she signed the
contract, that she expressed this to the defendant and that the sale
of the renewal right was forced upon her by virtue of the superior
economic strength and market dominance of the defendant."
American courts are not adverse to extending protection to an
author's moral right; they have, through a variety of legal theories,
protected these rights. Fashioning a moral right doctrine suitable
to the needs of the author, users of creative works and the public is
possible and necessary. It is unfortunate that the needs of the pub-
lisher are often contrary to the rights of the author. This should not
blind us, however, to the necessary relationship which exists be-
tween them. The interest of both must be balanced with an eye
towards the benefit to the public.
It is also unfortunate that there is an implication that protection
of the author must be at the expense of the public. This is true only
if we consider the monopolistic nature of the copyright. Further
reflection would reveal that fuller protection of the author, in the
nature of moral right, benefits the public. Just as an author does not
exist wholly apart from his work, society does not exist wholly apart
from the work of its authors. Good literature, music and art become
a part of the culture and heritage of the society which spawned it.
Thus, the public also has a stake in maintaining the integrity of
these works."
67. The court also noted that although the defendant "as the only interested buyer may
have been in a position to drive a hard bargain with Landon, the exercise of such power is
not the kind of conduct proscribed by the antitrust laws . . ." Id. at 458. The hard bargaining
of the defendant is especially apparent where the contract in part granted defendant the right
to:
reproduce . . . spoken words taken from and/or based on the text or theme of said
literary property . . . in . . . motion pictures, using for that purpose all or a part
of the theme, text and/or dialogue contained in said literary property [and] adopt
one or more versions of said literary property, to add to and subtract from the
literary property, change the sequences thereof, change the title . . . in connection
with works or motion pictures wholly or partially independent of said literary prop-
erty . . . change the characters . . . change the descriptions of the said characters,
and use all thereof in new versions, adaptations and sequels . . .Id. at 459 (empha-
sis in original).
The effects of disproportionate bargaining seems to have been with us since the first
Copyright Act. Barbara Ringer has noted that: "One year after the enactment of the first
copyright law, Jeremy Belknap was forced to secure publication of "The Foresters," possibly
the first American novel, on terms that included not only the outright sale of the copyright
but also a guarantee of the price of paper for the edition. Success changed the bargaining
equation and a later contract between Belknap and the same publisher required no such
sacrifices. The case with James Fenimore Cooper is very similar." Ringer, 71wo Hundred
Years of American Copyright Law in ABA, Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117 (1977).
68. See Roeder, at 575; Katz, at 123.
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To summarize, establishing an American moral right doctrine
would have the following advantages: (1) A single cause of action
could be pleaded thereby eliminating the "shotgun" approach cur-
rently resorted to by authors to protect their work and reputation.
Moreover, the tort theories currently used by authors often fail to
adequately protect the author because they were not developed with
his special needs in mind. (2) With a single cause of action to work
with courts would be freed to establish rules relating to specific
injuries to authors rather than having to decide the applicable limits
of a wide variety of theories resorted to by plaintiffs. (3) A moral
right doctrine would better accommodate the needs and realities of
the author in the marketplace. The heavy reliance on contracts fails
to adequately protect the author from injury to his work and his
personality. (4) Since creative works form a part of the culture of a
society, affording the author additional rights to protect his work
also protects the society.
A Proposal For Adopting The Moral Right
As has already been stated, amending the copyright statues to
include moral right protection would raise possible constitutional
problems. The moral right, however, is consistent with American
legal principles generally and could be readily adopted under tort
concepts. An American tort for invasion of the moral right could be
composed of three major components: the right to disclose the work,
the paternity right and the right to the integrity of the work."
69. Many civil law countries also recognize the right of authors to withdraw their work from
futher publication when it no longer conforms to their philosophical convictions. For example,
the French copyright law provides that:
Notwithstanding the transfer of the exploitation rights, the author, even after the
publication of his work, shall enjoy, in relation to the transferee, the right to correct
or retract. He cannot, however, exercise this right except on the condition that he
indemnify the transferee beforehand for the loss that the correction or retraction
may cause him.
CLTW, Law No. 57-296 on Literary and Artistic Property (France), Title II, art. 32.
It has been pointed out that the duty to indemnify would, in most cases, be so costly as to
render the right nugatory. Strauss, at 134. A further reason for its exclusion from the scheme
proposed is its ineffectiveness. As Sarraute observed: "The right of withdrawal is clearly of
so little efficacy that it has never, to our knowledge, been exercised since the 1957 law [Law
No. 57-296] was promulgated. No writer has found it desireable to ask the courts to assess
the indemnity he would be required to pay . . . in order to secure the chimerical opportunity
to attempt to suppress an already published work. Sarraute, supra note 15, at 477.
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The Right to Disclose
Unpublished works'" have traditionally been protected in the
United States by state law." The Copyright Act now extends to
these works, thus allowing the author to enforce his right to exclu-
sively exploit his work by means of the federal statutes." The right
to exploit allows the author to determine the manner in which the
work will be publicly disclosed, to prevent others from disclosing the
work without his consent or to prevent publication altogether."
The protection afforded authors in this country, prior to publica-
tion, closely parallels that of moral right countries. Fuller protection
is possible, however, by adopting the French approach of dealing
with authors who have contracted to create a work and subsequently
cannot complete it. Under moral right the author in such a situation
cannot be compelled to create against his will. While American law
insures the same result by denying specific performance in personal
service contracts," the threat of damages for breach may have the
effect of forcing authors to deliver an inferior work." French courts
have protected the author in such situations by limiting damages
to the return of any amounts received from the other party in all
cases where failure to complete the contract is not the result of bad
faith." The French approach more fully recognizes the intimate
70. "Publication" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as:
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution,
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.
71. Prior to the New Copyright Act state law automatically protected all creative works
prior to publication. This, the so-called "common law copyright," applied to all creative
works and precluded anyone but the author from publicly disclosing the work. See,e.g., CAL.
CIv. CODE § 980(a) (West 1954).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
73. See id. at § 106. See also Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 244
N.E.2d 250 (1969). Courts have also held that a creditor may not seize and publish the
manuscript of an author. Dart v. Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879). See Bartlett v. Crittenden,
2 F. Cas. 967 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076).
74. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3390(1) (West 1970).
75. See Harms v. Stern, 222 F. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) in which Learned Hand held that the
agreement between a composer and publisher could not be specifically enforced where the
composer repudiated the contract to deliver compositions to the publisher. The contract,
however, was valid at law and the publisher could recover damages. See also Roller v. Weigle,
261 F. 250 (D.C. Cir. 1919).
76. The Whistler case is perhaps the classic example of bad faith on the part of an artist.
The famous painter had been commissioned to paint a portrait, after completing the work
he became dissatisfied with the price and painted out the face of the work and refused to
deliver it. The court while refusing to order Whistler to complete the contract did assess
damages. Eden v. Whistler (Trib. Civ. Seine, Mar. 20, 1895, D.P. 1898.2.465) (as reported in
Roeder, at 559).
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relationship between the author and his work and protects him from
being coerced to deliver an inferior work which may damage his
reputation.
The Paternity Right
In comparison with the moral right countries, the ability of an
author to control the use of his name in association with his work is
severely limited in the United States. Adopting the moral right
would permit an author to insist on the use of his name in connec-
tion with his work, to prevent his name from being used in connec-
tion with someone else's work and to prevent the use of his real
name if he chooses to publish under a pen name or anonymously.
Under present case law the burden is placed on the author to
expressly reserve the right to have his name published with his
work. Failing this he has no right to insist on the use of his name."
In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.," an artist, who had done a number of
drawings for a magazine, failed in his attempt to have his name
published with the drawings. In denying relief, the court interpreted
the contract granting the magazine use of the author's name as
imposing no duty on the magazine to in fact use it. Clemens v. Press
Publishing Co." involved the sale of a manuscript with no contrac-
tual agreement insuring the use of the author's name. Although the
suit involved payment for the manuscript, the court had occassion
to observe that: "Title to the manuscript having passed by the
completed contract . . . the defendant was not obligated to publish
. . . with or without [the plaintiffs] name."s0
Aside from the courts, the New Copyright Act also places the
burden on the author to expressly reserve the right to the use of his
name with his work in "works made for hire." Section 201(b) states:
"In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for pur-
The French courts have taken the position that an author's "lack of inspiration" to com-
plete a work contracted for, is not a breach of contract, but rather a risk understood and taken
by all parties involved. Sarraute, supra note 15, at 468.
77. Nelson v. R.C.A., 148 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1957). See also Clemens v. Press Publishing
Co., supra note 20. A surprising number of writers and courts have mistakenly argued that
this right exists under the decision in Clemens. See Strauss, at 128; Note, supra note 15, at
511; Harms Inc. v. Tops Music Enterprises, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958).The
concurring opinion of Judge Seabury in Clemens is at once the source of this confusion, and
the strongest argument for recognizing this right. See quote accompanying supra note 21.
78. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
79. 122 N.Y.S. 206, 67 Misc. 183 (1910).
80. Id. at 207, 67 Misc. at 184.
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poses of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.""
Just as the author should be given credit for his work, he should
be able to prevent the use of his name in association with a work
not his own. This right appears to be as well protected in the United
States as it is in countries which have adopted the moral right. The
dictum in Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co.," that "no person has
the right to hold another out to the world as the author of literary
matter which he never wrote"" has been upheld by later courts
using a variety of legal theories." Its inclusion into an American
moral right doctrine would not conflict with any established legal
principles.
Moral right also safeguards the identity of an author who has
chosen to publish under a pen name or anonymously." Whether this
same right exists under American law is still the subject of contro-
versy among legal writers. Ellis v. Hurst" has been cited as author-
ity by those arguing that such a right exists, as well as by those
arguing against the existence of such a right." In the Ellis case, an
author, who had developed a reputation from forty years of writing
juvenile and historical works under his real name, sought to enjoin
the publication of two of his stories under his real name which he
originally published under a nom de plume. The court granted relief
to the plaintiff under the then recently enacted New York right to
privacy statute, which precluded the unauthorized use of a person's
name "for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade." The
court noted, however, that such relief would not have been possible
prior to the enactment of the statute. Since the New York statute
served as the model for many states while drafting right to privacy
legislation," it is probably safe to conclude that the decision in Ellis
would be followed by a majority of states.
The Clemens decision, as well as the case of Shostakovich v.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976).
82. 14 F. 728 (N.D. Ill. 1883).
83. Id. at 731.
84. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207,
127 P.2d 577 (1942).
85. Roeder, at 562.
86. 121 N.Y.S. 438, 66 Misc. 235 (1910).
87. Roeder, at 562; NIMMER, supra note 53, at 447.
88. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs 805 (4th ed. 1971).
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Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.," are also frequently cited as
authority for the proposition that an author does not have the right
to object to the use of his name in connection with his work. These
cases, however, merely hold that a work which has entered the pub-
lic domain may be reproduced in the manner in which they were
published. In Clemens, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of his
nom de plume, Mark Twain, from being used in connection with
some of his sketches which had entered the public domain. In deny-
ing relief to Clemens, the court held that a work which is published
without copyright becomes public property and "any person who
chooses to do so has the right to republish it, and to state the name
of the author in such form in the book." 0 Shostakovich involved the
work of a group of internationally famous Russian composers being
used in an anti-Soviet film. Since the plaintiffs were Russian citi-
zens their work was not entitled to copyright protection and the
court citing Clemens denied the requested injunction to prohibit the
use of their names with the film. There is no indication, however,
that the court would have arrived at a different result than that
found in Ellis had the composition been published under a nom de
plume or anonymously.
The Right to Maintain the Integrity of the Work
The right of an author to prevent the distortion or mutilation of
his work is the cornerstone of the moral right doctrine. While not
recognizing moral right, American courts have also demonstrated a
determined effort to protect the integrity of literary, artistic and
musical works." Adoption of the moral right would facilitate the
courts in this endeavour. Granz v. Harris" exemplifies the lengths
to which courts have gone in order to protect a work in the absence
of moral right. There, an imaginative court held that where an
assignee is obligated by contract to publish the name of the author
with the work, there exists an implied duty to maintain the integrity
of the work so as not to render the use of the author's name a false
attribution of credit.
89. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 196 Misc. 67 (1948).
90. Clemens, supra note 82, at 730.
91. See Royle v. Dillingham, 104 N.Y.S. 793, 53 Misc. 383 (1907); Harms Inc. v. Tops
Music Enterprises, Inc., 160 F. Supp 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc.,
213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 49
Misc. 2d 362 (1966).
92. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
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In Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co.," the California Superior
Court came very close to granting an injunction on the basis of
moral right. Not fully understanding the doctrine," however, Judge
Nutter relied on an aspect of the right to privacy to enjoin commer-
cial interruptions of the plaintiffs film." The court granted relief in
the following form:
The defendants . . . would be enjoined . . . from cutting or edit-
ing the motion picture "A Place in the Sun" for the purpose of
inserting therein in connection with the broadcast of said motion
picture over television any commercials, advertisements or other
messages, skits, speeches, playlets, musical or other material
which will so alter, adversely affect or emasculate the artistic or
pictorial quality of said motion picture so as to destroy or distort
materially or substantially the mood, effect, or continuity of said
motion picture as produced and directed by plaintiff."
Granz and Stevens are clear examples of the determination of
American courts to protect the integrity of creative works. Their
need, however, to resort to such tort concepts as invasion of privacy
to protect an artistic work indicates a need for an American moral
right doctrine.
The Duration and Alienability of Moral Right
In those countries where the moral right is recognized it is often
deemed to be perpetual." It has been argued that since the honor
and reputation of the author continues after his death, the right
which protects his work and his name should similarly continue."
93. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966).
94. Referring to Judge Frank's statements in Granz v. Harris, Judge Nutter stated: "I
frankly had a little difficulty in following Judge Frank's remarks . . . and so my relief granted
here will not be based upon his referring to so-called 'moral rights' and other 'bundles of
rights,' which he stated are enforced in civil-law countries." Id. at 756.
95. Judge Nutter based his opinion on the "false light" concept. Id. This form of invasion
of privacy consists of publicity which places the plaintiff before the public in a false light.
Thus, publicly attributing to the plaintiff "some opinion or utterance, such as spurious books
or articles" has been held to violate the right to privacy. PROSSER, supra note 88, at 812.
96. Stevens, supra note 93, at 758. While the court did not attempt to define the phrase
"distort materially or substantially," Judge Nutter did indicate that interrupting a televised
version of Hamlet in the middle of Hamlet's soliloquy would substantially affect its mood.
Id. The French courts have had little theoretical difficulty working with the equally vague
concept of mutilation. Sarraute, supra note 15, at 480.
97. The wording in the following French statute is typical of moral right legislation: "The
author shall enjoy respect for his name, his authorship and his work. This right shall be
attached to his person. It shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible . . . CLTW,
Law No. 57-296 on Literary and Artistic Property (France) Title 1, art. 6.
98. Katz, at 122-23.
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According perpetuity to moral right on such grounds would not
coincide with present American legal principles. The reputation of
all individuals continues after death, yet the present law of defama-
tion recognizes no right in the relatives of one deceased to bring such
a suit."
The perpetuity of the moral right finds better support and should
be adopted on public policy grounds. The work of an author, as
previously noted, is also a part of the society's heritage, any injury
to the work is also an injury to the society. "For this reason," it has
been stated, "the moral right should be deemed to be perpetual, and
its protection . . . should be entrusted to institutions which are the
natural guardians of the culture in each country, such as academies,
associations of writers and artists, etc."'"" Entrusting literary and
artistic works to the protection of such organizations, however,
should only come after works have entered the public domain and
there are no heirs of the author to enforce the moral right.'"' Prior
to this, the right to enforce the moral right should pass to the au-
thor's heirs in the same manner as the copyright.102
99. PROSSER, supra note 88, at 744.
100. LADAS, at 602.
101. A French statute of 1946 created an autonomous public institution called the National
Literary Fund which has been given the task of "protecting the integrity of literary works,
regardless of their country of origin, which, after the author's death, have fallen into the
public domain." Sarraute, supra note 15, at 484. Note, however, that art. 6 of the 1957 French
copyright law gives to the heirs of the author the right to protect the work following the
author's death. Thus, when the National Literary Fund sought to confiscate a distorted
version of Victor Hugo's Les Miskrables the court held that since Hugo still had living heirs
they alone could bring suit. Id.
Hungary also entrusts the protection of creative works in the public domain to literary,
artistic and musical organizations:
After the expiration of the term of protection, the organizations entitled to repre-
sent the interests of authors, or other organs appointed by the Minister of Culture,
shall be qualified to take action for the protection of the moral rights of the author,
whenever the use of the work distorts it or is injurious to the reputation of the
author.
CLTW, Copyright Act of April 26, 1969 (Hungary), ch. II, art. 12(3).
102. Entrusting the protection of creative works to literary, artistic or musical organiza-
tions, upon the death of the author, may be the source of conflict between differing rights.
Under our copyright statutes, the ownership of the copyright in a work, if not bequeathed,
will pass as personal property by the laws of intestate succession, thereby giving the deceased
author's heir the exclusive right to exploit the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1976). If the right
to enforce the moral right were in the hands of an organization, it would then be in a position
to preclude the holder of the copyright from exploiting the work in any manner harmful to
the reputation of the author or the work.
Most moral right countries, upon the death of the author, recognize the right of his heirs
to both exploit his work and to enforce the moral right. See supra note 101. The French
copyright statutes, however, provide that: "In case of manifest abuse of the exercise or non-
exercise of the right to disclose a work by the deceased author's representatives . . . the
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It should be obvious that not all aspects of the moral right can
be perpetual. What has been termed the positive aspects of moral
right, such as the right to create or modify the work, must of necess-
ity terminate at the author's death. Just as clearly, the negative
aspects, such as the right to prevent mutilation, should continue in
perpetuity.
Just as the moral right is generally said to be perpetual, it is also
frequently held to be inalienable.'0 3 Katz has taken this to mean
that the moral right is incapable of being expressly contracted
away.'"' Strauss, taking a contrary view, has argued that the right
"is inalienable only in the sense that, like all personal rights, it is
not capable of transfer by sale or gift. But there is no effective rule
of law which prevents an author from waiving one or more of the
components of the moral right.""' Necessity, it seems, has driven
the morial right countries closer to Strauss' position. The need of the
motion picture industry to modify original works when adapting
them to the screen, for example, has caused French courts to uphold
contracts permitting alterations.'"o
Adopting such a position, it has been argued, undermines the
whole concept of moral right because the publisher, possessing supe-
rior bargaining power, will simply demand that all the author's
rights be transferred.'"' While admitting the possibility of this, a
hard rule restricting the transfer of such rights would be adverse to
current legal principles and seriously curtail the functioning of in-
dustries which rely on the use of creative works.
Roeder, recognizing the competing needs of the author and the
publisher, has observed that:
tribunal civil may order any appropriate measure." CLTW, Law No. 57-296 on Literary and
Artistic Property (France), Title I, art. 20. See Brugnier Roure v. de Corton (Gaz. Pal.
1906.1.374, D.A. 1907, 137) (as reported in Strauss, at 126) where the court defended a work
against the deceased author's heirs.
103. See supra note 97.
104. Katz, at 126. Ladas has also argued that the consent of an author should not be
effective to transfer moral rights. To permit an author to renounce his right to the use of his
name in connection with his work or to prevent alterations, Ladas maintains, would permit
a deceit to be practiced on the public. LADAS, at 599. The weakness of the argument is that
should the author choose not to object, although he has the right to, the deceit will be
practiced on the public regardless.
105. Strauss, at 141. The wording of the Hungarian statute is contrary to Strauss' state-
ment: "Moral rights shall be unlimited in time. The author shall not be entitled to assign
these rights to others and shall not be entitled to waive such rights." CLTW, Copyright Act
of April 26, 1969 (Hungary), ch. II, art. 12(1).
106. Sarraute, supra note 15, at 481-82.
107. Katz, at 128-29.
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On the one hand, a strict construction of the creator's moral right
might leave him free always to withdraw his consent and insist
that the work be presented only in its original form. On the other
hand, the principle of freedom to contract must be recognized;
highly complex and important investments have been made in
industries which utilize and alter created works. Their investments
must receive some protection. It is generally recognized, therefore,
that authority to alter works may be granted and will bind the
creator and his successors. The authority should be, in general,
strictly construed in favor of the creator and nontransferable un-
less a contrary intent plainly appears."'
Roeder also recognized the vulnerability of the author in contracting
with publishers and suggests a limitation to preclude overreaching:
In no case should the modifications go so far as to attribute to the
creator ideas which he does not believe and did not originally ex-
press; nor should the intrinsic esthetic quality of the work be sub-
ject to alteration; even though the power to modify be given, a
tragedy cannot be changed to a comedy, a philosophic essay to a
farce."'
It is proposed that Roeder's suggestions present a workable and
fair solution to a difficult problem. By proscribing extensive modifi-
cations, even where the author's consent has been obtained, the
character of the moral right as inalienable is not totally lost. Hold-
ing all transfers of the moral right ineffective places an undue bur-
den on the publisher which cannot but seriously disrupt the indus-
tries authors are dependent upon. The author's interest, rightly
understood, militates against holding the moral right completely
nontransferable.
A recent court, while conceding that the moral right is not recog-
nized in the United States, stated what appears to be the prevalent
attitude among American jurists. "Nevertheless," wrote the court,
"the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that
serves as the foundation for American Copyright Law . . . cannot
be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutila-
tion or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the
artists are financially dependent.""" The court is right in more ways
than it perhaps intended. The plight of the author cannot be recon-
ciled with the copyright laws. In the absence of both copyright and
108. Roeder, at 570.
109. Id. at 571. Such an approach would have afforded the plaintiff in London a cause of
action. See text accompanying note 58, supra.
110. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., supra note 59, at 19.
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moral right to meet the obvious needs of the author, courts have had
to test the limits of reason itself to meet the ends of justice. It is
proposed that adoption of the moral right as outlined above would
facilitate the courts in their effort.
Conclusion
In many respects the moral right in the United States occupies
the same position as the right of privacy prior to the famous article
by Warren and Brandeis."' The courts, they concluded, using a
variety of legal theories, were in reality protecting a basic right of
individuals to be let alone which was entitled to separate recogni-
tion."' In the case of moral right we have seen that our courts,
whenever possible, have sought to protect the author when his rights
have been obviously infringed. To do so, however, they have had to
resort to a variety of legal theories which are oftentimes inappro-
priate. Would it not be preferable to adopt the moral right as an
independent tort?
Adopting the moral right in this country could be accomplished
with less difficulty than that which accompanied the right of pri-
vacy. The moral right exists, it is not an unknown concept with
limits to be defined. The moral right statutes of the civil law coun-
tries, as well as the wealth of cases construing them, are a ready
resource which could be drawn on.
The lack of precedence for the right to privacy did not preclude
its adoption by our courts."' Similarly, it should not act as a bar to
the adoption of the moral right. Admittedly, invasion of privacy
may have presented a more compelling need for judicial action; a
threat of injury, however, should not go unchecked simply because
it poses a threat primarily to a limited class. The multiple facets of
the moral right also should not be an obstacle to its adoption as a
single tort. The variety of ways the right to privacy may be invaded
is again a ready and apt example."'
111. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
112. Id. at 205.
113. Following the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, several lower New York
courts accepted the existence of a right to privacy. The Court of Appeals, in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) rejected the existence of such a
right on the basis of, inter alia, lack of precedence. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) rejected the reasoning
in Roberson and became the leading case. PROSSER, supra note 88, at 803-04.
114. The right to privacy may be invaded by: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude;
(2) publicly disclosing private facts; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye; (4) appropriation of the plaintiff's likeness or name for the defendant's benefit.
Id. at 804-14.
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American courts have demonstrated a willingness to protect the
rights of authors. In those instances where obvious injustice has
failed to be remedied by our courts the inadequacy of present tort
and contract theories to meet the special needs of the author is to
blame. The argument of opponents of the moral right, namely that
our courts already substantially protect those rights covered by the
doctrine, is the strongest argument in favor of adopting the moral
right in this country. Since our courts are not adverse to protecting
the interests of the author, the ends of justice would be better served
by fashioning a doctrine more suitable to their special needs. It is
always too soon to say that what is is adequate. Better solutions to
age old problems should be sought.
